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1. INTRODUCTION
The concept of the product life cycle, which has been much
discussed and debated (e.g., Bass, 1969; Dhalla and Yuspeh, 1976;
Wasson, 1978), describes a time-dependent sequence of stages that
products go through from the time of initial production and sales to
the time of the retirement of the product due to obsolescence. The
concept of the process life cycle, introduced by Abernathy and
Townsend (1975) and Abernathy and Utterback (1975), describes an
analogous sequence of stages that manufacturing processes go through,
as the product being manufactered matures. Hayes and Wheelwright
(1979a, 1979b) suggest using a two-dimensional map to describe a
firm's location in product-process life cycle space. (See Figure 1.)
They then develop a theory of technology choice over the product life
cycle and discuss the hypothesis that most firms should compete "on
the diagonal" of their diagram. That is, as a product evolves from a
one-of-a-kind prototype to a high-volume, highly standardized item,
the manufacturing process should evolve from a flexible, manual job
shop-like process with general purpose tools and broadly skilled
workers to a rigid, highly automated, assembly line-like process with
special-purpose machines and narrowly trained workers.
In addition, Hayes and Wheelwright (1979b) describe three
potentially desirable entrance-exit strategies that may be used over
the product life cycle. These are:
-2-
A: enter early and get out early, when profit margins first
begin to drop;
B: enter early and remain in the market throughout the
product life cycle by adapting process technologies
as needed; and
C: enter only after the market has matured, and product
and process have stabilized to some degree.
Note that strategies A and C may require only one type of process
technology, where strategy B is likely to entail a significant
technological shift at some point.
The informal theory building of Hayes and Wheelwright has been
very useful in helping some analysts and managers develop better
intuition concerning strategies for entry, exit, and technology choice
over the product life cycle. However, their qualitative mode of
analysis limits significantly one's ability to analyze the sensitivity
of their descriptions and prescriptions to specific industry
circumstances. One purpose of this paper is to build on the Hayes-
Wheelwright work by developing a formal model that captures their
basic analysis but allows additional exploration and insight into
the issues they raise.
Some observers (e.g., Goldhar [1986), Noori [1986]) have
suggested that the existence of flexible, automated manufacturing
technologies necessitates a reexamination of the Hayes-Wheelwright
theory. To wit, manufacturing automation gives rise to the
possibility that a firm could use a flexible manufacturing system to
simultaneously manufacture several different products, each in a
different stage in its life cycle. Under this regime, each product
I
-3-
would be manufactured by the system over its entire life cycle; only
the mix of products would change as the different products progressed
through their life cycles. This line of reasoning suggests that
flexible automation decouples the product and process life cycles,
because a factory with this technology can economically manufacture a
range of products in all stages of their life cycles.
In our model, holding flexible capacity is motivated by the
economies of using one technology to manufacture different products
whose demand patterns are known but possibly asynchronous. This
contrasts with the model of Fine and Freund (1987) where flexible
capacity is held as a hedge against uncertainty of the future product
demand mix.
The models most closely related to ours are those of Cohen and
Halperin (1986) and Hutchinson and Holland (1982). These papers
relate, respectively, to sections two and three of our paper. Cohen
and Halperin analyze a single-product dynamic, stochastic model of
technology choice, where a technology is characterized by three
parameters: the purchase cost, the fixed per period operating cost,
and the variable, per unit production cost. Their principal result,
which is consistent with our analysis of section two, gives conditions
sufficient to guarantee that an optimal technology sequence exhibits
nonincreasing variable costs.
The Hutchinson and Holland analysis, although quite different
from ours in its approach, is quite similar to our section three in
spirit. Both pieces of work seek to understand what factors affect
the relative profitability of flexible and dedicated technologies in
an environment where there are multiple products with different life
 ·- _··
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cycles. Hutchinson and Holland address this question by simulating
manufacturing system performance for a stochastic product stream,
first assuming all technologies are transfer lines (inflexible), and
again, assuming all technologies are flexible manufacturing systems
(FMS's). They assume that FMS's have higher variable production
costs, but exhibit two types of flexibility: capacity can be added
incrementally, rather than all at once, and capacity can be converted
to produce more than one product. The authors' 192 simulation runs
suggest that the value of flexible systems relative to transfer lines
increases in the rate of new product introductions and the maximum
capacity of FMS's increase, and decreases in the interest rate and the
average volume per part produced.
In section two we formulate a one-product deterministic model of
optimal entry, exit, and technology choice over the product life
cycle. This model is meant to capture the basic intuition of the
Hayes-Wheelwright analysis and permits additional investigation of the
issues raised in their work. For this model we solve for the optimal
technology choice policies and show how these policies change as a
function of certain key parameters. Section three presents a model of
technology choice with flexible technologies for two products with
overlapping product life cycles. Under the taxonomy of Piore (1986),
we focus on technologies for flexible mass production (as was also
done in Fine and Freund (1987)) as opposed to technologies for
flexible specialization. Our model allows us to address the above-
mentioned extension of the Hayes-Wheelwright analysis. One result of
this analysis is that optimal deployment of product-flexible
manufacturing capacity may dictate devoting flexible capacity to a
I
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narrow range of products at the peak of some product life cycles. In
Section four we discuss how our results provide insight into the life
cycle of a flexible manufacturing system and how they add perspective
to the presumption by Jaikumar (1986) that optimal deployment of
flexible manufacturing systems will exhibit broad product ranges at
all times. Section five contains a discussion of how competition will
affect our results and some concluding remarks.
2. THE SINGLE-PRODUCT TECHNOLOGY CHOICE MODEL
We formulate the single product technology choice problem as a
discrete-time dynamic program with discount factor 6. Demand for the
firm's product is indexed by at. To model the time path of demand
over the product life cycle, we assume ao=o and that at increases
(weakly) monotonically and deterministically to a point T where it
peaks, and then decreases monotonically and deterministically until
the market is no longer profitable. We assume that there exists a
finite time t such that t inf {t: a t > 0)} and a finite time t** >
T > to such that at**= 0 and a t < 0 for all t > t**.
The firm has two manufacturing processes available to it: a
labor-intensive process (indexed by L) that has high variable
costs per unit, but a low initial investment and startup cost (IL);
and a capital-intensive process (indexed by K) that has low variable
costs per unit, but a high initial investment and startup cost
(IK > IL). We think of the labor-intensive process as being analogous
to the job shop process of Hayes and Wheelwright (1979a) and the
capital-intensive process as being like their assembly line process.
However, in the single-product case of this section, one ought to
I I I I I~~~~~~~~~I
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think of process L as being a labor-intensive assembly or batch flow
line, because the product flexibility provided by a job shop is not
relevant.
If the firm operates technology T (= L or K) in period t, then it
earns period t profits of n(at,T). (For example, suppose a firm pays
a fixed cost per period F T and a per unit production cost of CT when
it uses technology T, and faces a linear inverse demand curve pt(qt) =
at-bqt, where pt(qt) is the market price when qt is produced; then
1(at,T) = max qt(at-bqt-CT)-FT.) We use to denote the null technology;
qt
that is, the firm is not participating in the market. We assume
r(at,$) = 0 for all a t. For T = L or K, we assume that (at,T) < 0
for a t < 0 and (at,T) is continuous and nondecreasing in at for all
a t. We use 1 (at,T) to denote the first derivative of the profit
function with respect to the demand index a t. Because the capital-
intensive process has lower variable costs than the labor-intensive
process, we also assume that for at > O, Tl(at,L) < nl(at,K), the
profit function for the labor-intensive process is less steep than the
profit function for the capital-intensive process.
In each period, the firm can either be in the market or out of
the market. If not in the market at period t, the firm observes at
and decides whether or not to enter the market. If it stays out, it
earns zero profits ( (at,%) = 0). If it chooses to enter, it must
first purchase one of the two types of manufacturing technologies (at
cost IL or IK) before earning operating profits of (at,T) for the
period. If the firm is already in the market at time t, it may
__
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choose to produce with the technology it already owns or purchase the
other technology. Disposal costs for either technology are zero.
That is, we assume that the net effect of exit costs and salvage value
is zero. This assumption is also made by Meyer (1971), Kamien and
Schwartz (1972), Hutchinson and Holland (1982), Burstein and Talbi
(1985), and others. (We discuss the relaxation of this assumption
towards the end of Section Three.) We also assume that a firm cannot
maintain a technology that is not being used. That is, after
abandoning the use of one technology for another, if the firm ever
wants to produce again with the abandoned process, it must pay again
the startup/investment cost IL or IK.
This problem can be formulated as a dynamic program, as follows.
Let Tt be the decision variable that denotes the technology used at
time t, so that Tt c {,K,L}, where
means out of the market;
Tt = K means capital-intensive process;
L means labor-intensive process.
Also, let (Tt-1,Tt) denote the technology switching cost, i.e.,
0 if Tt_ 1 = Tt or Tt =
P(Tt-1,Tt) = IK if Tt-1 Tt = K
IL if Tt-1 Tt = L.
Then, the technology choice problem can be stated as
-,I-
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max t**
(Tt) E &t-1 [(at,Tt) - P(Tt-l,Tt)], (2.1)
1<t<t** t=l
where T = T**+ = . Note that without loss of generality, we can
optimize over an infinite horizon because the firm will optimally
choose Tt = for t > t**, and periods t = t**+l, t**+2,..., will
contribute zero to profits. As in Hutchinson and Holland (1982), Fine
and Freund (1987), Gaimon (1987), and most of Cohen and Halperin
(1986), we assume no interperiod inventories. This is somewhat
restrictive, but holds in many circumstances. For example, most
service companies are characterized by the fact that services are
produced and sold at the same time; their products are not in-
ventoriable. This is also true for perishable-goods producers. In
addition, in some style goods industries, e.g., automobiles, producers
vary their products each year and choose to manipulate prices and
buyer incentives to assure that no interperiod inventories are held.
To analyze this dynamic programming problem, we first define for
T = K or L, a T to be the smallest value of at that gives the firm non-
0
negative profits when it owns technology T, i.e., aT = inf {a:n(a,T) > O}.
We define a* such that n(a,K) > (a,L) if and only if a > a*. (The
conditions on (a,L) and (a,K) assure that a* exists and is unique.)
For the analyses that follow, we assume a > max (aL,a*). This
assumption assures that both technologies can be economically viable.
Otherwise the problem has only one economically feasible technology,
the problem studied in Fine and Li (1986) in a stochastic, duopolistic
setting. We define t* and t* to be (respectively) the first and last
_II _
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times that (a,K) > n(a,L). Therefore a t = a* = at, and t < t < t*.
These times should be thought of as candidate times for switching from
the labor-intensive process to the capital intensive process (t*) and
from the capital-intensive process to the labor-intensive process
(t*). As it turns out, these are the optimal switching times only if
6 = 1, but they are useful for understanding the analysis of the
optimal switching times for the case when 6 < 1.
For analogous reasons, we define for T = K,L, tT and tT as
(respectively) the first and last times that the technology T is
profitable. That is, for T = K,L, tT = inf{t: (at,T) > O} and tT =
sup{t: (atT) > }.
We proceed with the analysis by dividing the parameter space to
look at two cases: aK < aL and aK > aL These cases correspond to
whether the capital-intensive process has a lower breakeven point than
0 0
the labor-intensive process (aK aL) or vice versa. Either of
these assumptions may be reasonable, depending on the cost structure
associated with the technologies. For example, if the capital-
intensive technology requires a large cadre of support labor
(maintenance, engineers, etc.) to keep it running, then it will
require high levels of output to cover the fixed costs of keeping
0 0
the plant operating, so aK > aL would be reasonable. On the other
hand, if the highly automated plant can be kept up and running with a
small staff, then, because of its low variable costs, the capital-
intensive technology may have a lower breakeven point than the labor-
intensive one.
I
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In the former case (Figure 2) we have a* < aK < aL < a. In
this case, the firm will never switch technologies. To see this,
first note that n(a,K) > (a,L) for all values of a that yield
positive profits with either technology. If the firm invests in
technology K, then it will never switch to technology L because
T(a,K) > n(a,L) over the entire range where technology L yields
positive profits. On the other hand, if the firm invests in the
labor-intensive technology (because its investment cost is
significantly lower), it will be because the capital-intensive
technology was too costly to invest in at all. Thus, there are only
three strategies a firm would follow in this case: invest only in the
capital-intensive process, invest only in the labor-intensive process,
or stay out of the market.
To determine which of these policies is optimal, we first let
rr(at,T) = max ((at,T), 0) and let UT(s) denote the discounted
profit stream to the firm if it invests in technology T (= K or L) at
time se (tT, tT) and uses it until time tT. (Our assumption of a zero
net effect on profits of exit costs and salvage benefits guarantees
that tT is the optimal exit time.) Therefore, we have
t +
UT(S) = 6 t(as+t'T)+.
t=O
If the firm invests in technology T at time s, its profit net of
investment (calculated at time s) is UT(s) - IT. Consider postponing
the investment one period from time s to time s + 1. The benefit of
this postponement is [UT(s+1) - IT] - [UT(S) - IT], so that the firm
will find it beneficial to postpone the investment in technology T
__
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from s to s+1 if (1-6) IT > (as,T) . This observation yields three
conclusions, stated as
Proposition 1. Assume technology T is the only technology available.
If (1 -6)IT > (aT,T), then the firm will never enter with technology
T. If (1-6 )IT < (a ,T), then ST, defined as the smallest integer
that satisfies tT < ST < T and T(aST ,T) < (1-6)IT (a STT),
is the candidate entry time for technology T. If UT(ST) -IT < 0,
then the firm will never use technology T and we set ST = ; otherwise
the firm will enter at time ST < .
Proposition 1 suggests a two-stage calculation for the
determination of the optimal entry time when only one technology,
technology T, is to be considered. First the entry time (ST) that
maximizes the present value of profits net of investment is
calculated. The identified time is the optimal entry time if
discounted profits from entry at that time are positive. That is,
if UT(ST)-IT > 0.
Note that if 6 < 1 then ST will always be larger than tT and if
6=1 then ST = tT. That is, with a positive interest rate the optimal
time to invest will always be no earlier than the first time that the
technology generates a positive profit. The investment
decision is postponed beyond tT because the firm must earn a strictly
positive profit from the technology before foregoing the opportunity
cost of the capital it must invest for the acquisition.
O O
To find the optimal policy for the case aK < aLt we first
calculate SK SL
'
UK(SK)-IK
'
and UL(SL)-IL. If UK(SK)-I K and UL(SL)-IL
I
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are both negative, then the firm will never enter. If only one of
these terms is positive, then the firm will enter with the corre-
sponding technology at the candidate entry time for that technology
and exit at the corresponding tT. If both are positive, the firm
will enter at SK with technology K and exit at tK if UK(SK)-IK
> 6SL-SKUL(SL)-IL and will enter at SL with technology L and exit
at tL if this inequality is reversed.
0 0
In the second case, where aL < aK < a* < a (Figure 3), there
are six possible optimal technology strategies, depending on the
parameters of the model. These are: (1) use only the labor-intensive
technology, over the entire course of the product life cycle; (2) use
only the capital-intensive technology; (3) enter with the labor-
intensive technology and switch to the capital-intensive technology
when demand becomes sufficiently large; (4) enter with the capital-
intensive technology and switch to the labor-intensive process in the
twilight of the product's life cycle; (5) enter with the labor-
intensive process, switch to the capital-intensive process when demand
is high, and then switch back to the labor-intensive process toward
the end of the life cycle; and (6) do not enter the market. We will
sometimes denote these stragetiges, respectively, by the following
shorthand notation: L, K, L-K, K-L, L-K-L, and . Our usage of this
shorthand will be clear from the context. The analysis below
identifies the parameter conditions that support each of these six
strategies.
To begin the analysis, we first note that since we assume that
the net effect on profits of exit costs and salvage benefits is zero,
deriving optimal exit times is straightforward: If the firm holds
I - -
-13-
technology L at t* or later, then it will never switch to K after that
point (because n(at,L) > (at,K) for all t > t*) and it will exit at
time tL. If the firm holds technology K at t*, then it may choose to
switch to technology L some time after t*, but if it does not switch,
it will exit at tK.
The next results characterize the optimal times to switch
technologies - either from the capital-intensive to the labor-
intensive or vice versa. Since we assume that the net effect of exit
costs and salvage benefits from abandoning a technology is zero, the
tradeoff involves comparing the investment cost of purchasing the new
technology with the relative differences in discounted cash flows from
the different technologies. As in the preceding analyses, the optimal
switching times are adjusted from t* and t* to reflect the requirement
that the differential profits from the new technology exceed the
opportunity cost of the money to be invested.
Suppose the firm is already operating the capital-intensive
technology at time s and is considering a switch to the labor-
intensive process. If the firm switches at time s (and never switches
back) then the profits from s onward will be
E r(a + t, L) - IL'
t=O
whereas if it switches at time s+l, profits will be
+ t +1T(a ,K) + E 6 n ,(a L) - I
5 t=1 s+tL
The benefit to postponement from time s to time s+1 of the switch
from K to L is the difference:
BKL(s) = TT(as,K) - n(as,L) + (1-6)IL.KL ~~S 5 
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The graph of this function is shown in Figure 4. Since r(a ,K) += 0
0
for a K and (as,K) > l(as,L), BKL(s) is minimized at tK andfor a aK s _K
K 0tK , where at = aK' This observation leads to the conclusion that if
0 0
BKL(tK)= T(aK,K) - (aK,L) + (1-)I L > O, then the firm will never
switch from K to L.
From Figure 4, we observe that BKL(t) < 0 can occur in two
regions: one in the interior of (tL, t*) and the other in the
interior of (t*,tL). Clearly, the firm would never switch from K to L
in the first of these, since it would not have even acquired
technology K prior to SK > tK. On the other hand, in the latter
region, as demand is declining, the firm might find it profitable to
switch back to the labor-intensive technology, with its lower
breakeven point. We denote by SKL the candidate time for switching
from process K to process L.
Proposition 2. If BKL(t ) > 0 then the firm will never switch from the
capital-intensive technology to the labor-intensive technology. If
BKL(tK ) < O, then S defined by t* < SKL < tK and BKL(SKL-1) >
BKL(SKL), is the candidate time to switch from the capital-intensive
technology to the labor-intensive technology.
Similarly, to analyze a potential switch from the labor-intensive
to the capital-intensive process, we can define the benefit from
postponing such a switch from time s to time s+1, by
BLK(s) = (as,L) - n(as,K) + (1-6)I K.LK s s K
Note that BLK(s) is minimized at s=T (Figure 5).
I 
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Proposition 3. If BLK(T) > 0, then the firm will never switch from L to
K. If BLK(T) < O, then there exists a unique SLK, satisfying t* SLK
< and BLK(SLK-1) > > BLK(SLK), which is the candidate switching
time.
Together, the three propositions on the candidate adoption times
(SL, SK) and candidate switching times (SKL, SLK) yield the following
characterization (illustrated with a decision tree in Figure 6) of the
technology-choice dynamic program stated in (2.1):
Theorem 1. There are six possible optimal technology policies for this
model. These policies are:
1. Never enter the market (Tt = 4 for all t>O). This policy is
optimal whenever
UL(SL) < IL, and
UK(SK) < IK
2. Only use the labor-intensive technology (Tt = L for SL t < tL,
Tt = 4 otherwise). This policy is optimal whenever
UL(SL)-IL > max (0, 6SK-SL(UK(SK)-IK)
+ max (0, (ULS KL- SK (SK )-UK( (S KL)-IL)), and
UL(SLK) > UK(SLK)-IK + max (0, SKL-SLK(-UK(S KL) + UL(SKL)-I L))
3. Only use the capital-intensive technology (Tt = K for SK t t
Tt = * otherwise). This policy is optimal whenever
UK(SK)-IK > max (0, SLSK(UL(SL)-IL) + max (0, SLK-SK(UK( LK -
UL(SLK)-IK)), and
-
I
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UK(SKL) > UL ( S K L)- I L
4. Enter the market with the labor-intensive technology and later
switch to the capital-intensive technology (Tt = L for S L < t <
SLK, Tt = K for SLK < t < t, and Tt = 4 otherwise). This policy
is optimal whenever
UL(SL)-IL + 6SLK - S L (UK(SLK)-UL(SLK)-IK) > max (0, S K- SL (UK(SK)-IK)),
UL(SLK) < UK(SLK)-IK, and
UL(SKL)-IL < UK(SKL)
5. Enter the market with the capital-intensive technology and later
switch to the labor-intensive technology (Tt = K for SK < t < SKL,
L
Tt = L for SKL < t < t , and Tt = 4 otherwise). This policy is
optimal whenever
UK(SK)-IK > max (0, 6 S L - S K (UL(SL)-IL)) + 6SLK-SK max (0, UK(SLK)-
UL(SLK)- IK)), and
UL(SKL)-IL > UK(SKL).
6. Enter with technology L, switch to technology K in the high-demand
part of the life cycle, then switch back to technology L in the
decline phase of the life cycle (Tt = L for SL < t < SLK and
SK < t < t, T t = K for S < t < SKL and Tt = otherwise).KL t LK <
This policy is optimal whenever
UL(SL)-IL + 6SLK- S L (UK(SLK)-UL(SLK)-IK > max (0, 6S K - S L (UK(SK)-IK)),
UL(SKL)-IL > UK(SKL ) , and
UK(SLK)-I + SKL-SLK (-UK(SKL) + UL(SKL)-I L) > UL(SLK).
M 
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Figure 7, which is divided into six regions, illustrates how the
startup/investment costs, IL and IK, determine which of the six
policies is optimal. The region labels are abbreviations for the
policies that are optimal in those regions. For example, L-K-L means
use technology L from time SL to SLK, use K from SLK to SKL and use L
from SKL to tL. The graph illustrates that the six policies are
mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. (Note that since IK >
IL by assumption, we are only concerned with the area of the graph
below the 450 line.) For IK and IL sufficiently large (region in
the figure), the optimal policy is to stay out of the market
completely. This region consists of (IL, IK) pairs such that UL(SL) -
IL < 0 and UK(SK) - IK < 0, as in Theorem 1. The other regions are
defined analogously, following the characterization in Theorem 1.
We can contrast this analysis with the Hayes-Wheelwright
proposition that firms stay on the diagonal of the product-process
life cycle matrix. Presumably the diagonal of their matrix
corresponds to the L-K strategy. That is, enter with the labor-
intensive technology and then switch permanently to the capital-
intensive technology when industry demand has grown sufficiently.
Clearly, our model admits a wider range of potentially optimal
strategies than this.
Observe that strategy B of Hayes-Wheelwright, enter early and
stay throughout the product life cycle, corresponds to our strategy
L-K (or perhaps L-K-L), and their strategy C, enter late in the growth
stages or early in the maturity stage, corresponds to our strategy K.
However, our model never uses entry-exit strategy A of Hayes-
Wheelwright which dictates early entry and early exit in a product
market. Strategy A would be more reasonable in a multiproduct, multi-
- M 0 M M
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firm world. A firm could specialize in supplying product markets
early in their life cycles. For each product, the firm would enter
early, but then depart to supply the next new product once the
competition in the old product became severe. We discuss multiproduct
models in sections 3 and 4 and competition in section 5.
The contrasts between the Hayes-Wheelwright analysis and ours
suggest several lines of inquiry, both empirical and theoretical. On
the empirical side, one might try to estimate the parameter values
for our model in a number of industries and see whether industries
that exhibit parameters that yield optimality of, for example, the L-K
(stay on the diagonal) strategy, exhibit behavior consistent with the
model's predictions. On the theoretical side, we could extend the
model in several ways, to increase realism. In the two sections, we
extend our model to include multiple products and focus our analysis
on asynchronous product life cycles. One could also extend the model
to include multiple-firm competitive interaction. We discuss this
subject in Section 5.
3. THE TWO-PRODUCT TECHNOLOGY CHOICE MODEL
There are a number of issues that arise in the manufacturing
technology choice problem for a multiproduct firm that cannot be
captured by the single-product model of the previous section. For
example, if a firm chooses to produce several products with
asynchronous life cycles, then it may employ strategy A of Hayes and
Wheelwright, commencing manufacture of the first product early in its
life cycle and dropping that product during the maturity phase, while
switching to the next product early in its life cycle, etc. In
L~~~~~~~~~
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addition, the study of multiple products permits explicit considera-
tion of the use of product-flexible manufacturing technologies.
For ease of analysis and exposition, we limit ourselves in this
section to studying a two-product or two-product-family model. Most
of the important intuition can be illustrated with this case. We
label the two products (or product families) by A and B, respectively.
We assume there are three types of technologies: a labor-intensive,
job shop technology (indexed by L) that can produce both products; a
capital-intensive, dedicated technology (indexed by KA or KB) that can
produce only one product; and a capital-intensive, flexible
(automated) technology (indexed by KAB) that can produce both
products. As in the previous section, we assume that the labor
intensive technology has a low investment and startup cost and a high
variable cost per unit produced, relative to the capital-intensive
technologies. Extending in the obvious way the notation for
investment costs used in the previous section, we assume
IL < IK < I IL <IK < I ,and I < I + IK. The
A AB B AB AB A B
inequalities for the capital-intensive technology investment costs
parallel the assumptions in Fine and Freund (1987), that the flexible
automated technology is more costly to acquire and install than either
of the nonflexible technologies (otherwise one or both of the non-
flexible technologies would be economically dominated by the flexible
automated technology) and that acquiring and installing the flexible
automated technology is less costly than acquiring and installing both
nonflexible capital-intensive technologies (otherwise the flexible
automated technology is dominated by the joint acquisition of the two
nonflexible technologies).
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We let a t and bt, respectively, be the demand indices for products
A B B
A and B. Then A(at,Tt ) and T B(btTt ) represent the period t profits
from products A and B, respectively, given that the firm uses technology
A B
Tt for producing product A and Tt for product B. Extending thet t
notation of the previous section, we also define t = inf t:at>O} and
to = inf {t:bt>0}. As in the previous section we assume that theB t
firm earns zero profits from markets in which it is not a participant.
That is, A(at,0) = B(bt,) = 0 for all values of a t and b t. We also
A A B
assume that for all at and bt, A(at,KA) = iA(at,KAB) and nB(btKB)
= n (btKAB). That is, operating profits from a given market are the
same for each type of capital-intensive technology. (This assumption
allows us to simply use K to represent KA or KAB as the argument of the
profit functions.) This assumption -- of no economies of scope in
operating profits -- is justified on the grounds that, for highly
automated, capital-intensive technologies, the variable operating costs,
which are essentially the materials costs plus a small amount of labor
costs, will not depend significantly on whether the capital-intensive
technology is dedicated or flexible. We discuss the relaxation of this
assumption later.
We do assume that the operating cost structure of the labor-
intensive technology differs from that of the capital-intensive
technologies. As in the previous section, we model these differences
through assumptions on the first derivative of the profit function with
respect to the demand index. In particular, we assume 1! (at,L) <
1r (at K) for a > 0 and T1 (bt L) < TT (btK) for bt > O. Also, the
profit functions are negative for negative levels of the demand index
·I__ ·_I _ __ ·___ j
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and nondecreasing in the respective demand indices. As in the previous
section, we assume that the net effect of exit costs and salvage value
for each technology is zero and that a firm cannot maintain a technology
that is not being used.
With respect to the life cycles of the two products, we assume that
each product has a life cycle path that satisfies the assumptions of the
previous section. We examine two cases: synchronous life cycles and
asynchronous life cycles. (See Figures 8a and 8b respectively.) The
former case occurs when the life cycle stages of the two products
coincide roughly in time. Formally, we say that products A and B have
synchronous life cycles if for T = L or KAB, A(at,T) + B(bt,T) is
quasiconcave in t. That is, A(at,T) + B(at,T) is unimodal in t.
We let T A and TB represent the times when at and bt, respectively,
reach their peaks. For T = L, KA, KB, and KAB, in the manner of
Proposition 1 in the previous section, we define ST to be the candidate
entry time for each technology. Without loss of generality, we assume
SK < SK that is, product A precedes product B. We define the product
life cycles of products A and B to be asynchronous when inf {t: bt >
O} > A, i.e., when product B's life cycle does not start until after
product A's life cycle has peaked. By our definitions, synchronicity
and asynchronicity of life cycles are not collectively exhaustive, but
these definitions are useful for analyzing the qualitative properties
we wish to study.
In calculating S and UK (SK ) in the asynchronous life
AB AB AB
cycles case (figure 8b), the firm earns profits from product family A
right up until time tA** and earns profits from product family B
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beginning at t In contrast, when both KA and KB are used,
operating profits from product family A will cease at exit time
tKA and operating profits from product family B will not begin
until entry time SK . Thus, when flexible automation is acquired, its
optimal use can generate more total operating profits than using
separate, dedicated, automated processes for each product. (This will
also depend on the magnitude of the difference between SK and SK
AB A
the times when operating profits begin to flow from product family A
under the two respective strategies.) When a longer sequence of
products is considered (figure 9), this advantage of the flexible
technology becomes even more pronounced: firms can be more aggressive
in both their entry and exit times because all the fixed costs do not
have to be carried by one product; products very early or late in
their life cycles can "free ride" or at least share-the-ride with
other products.
Given this formulation of technology types and product life
cycles, we wish to explore what types of technology investment
policies are optimal in certain situations. To focus on insights
related to the existence of the flexible, capital-intensive
technology, we limit our analysis primarily to two simplified cases:
(1) only the L and KAB technologies are available, (2) only the KA,
KB, and KAB technologies are available. The formal analysis that
supports the results of this section is virtually identical to that of
section 2, so we suppress formal arguments in what follows and rely on
the readers' understanding of the previous section.
L
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We first examine case (1), where only the labor-intensive
flexible technology (L) and capital-intensive flexible technology
(KAB) are available. In the synchronous life cycle case, the analysis
parallels that of Section 2 exactly. Because each technology can
manufacture both products, we need only be concerned with the two-
product profit function, AB(at,bt,T) T A(atIT) + (bt,T), for T = L
or KAB. Let TAB(T) be the smallest time at which AB (at,bt,T)
achieves its maximum. (The time TAB(T) is unique if n AB(at,bt) is
strictly quasiconcave in t.) As in Section 2, we can define the break-
AB T AB
even times tT = inf (t: (at,bt) > 0) and t = sup (t: n (at,bt) >
0) for T = L, KAB. As in the previous section, in the case where the
capital-intensive technology has the lower breakeven time, i.e.,
tK < tL, the firm will never switch technologies, so there are onlyAB
three possible optimal strategies: never enter, use technology L from
SL to tL, or use technology KAB from SK to tKAB If, on the other
hand, the labor-intensive technology has the earlier breakeven time,
i.e., tL < tK then there are six possible strategies, analogous to
AB
those in Theorem 1, which we denote by , L, KAB, L-KAB, KAB-L, and
L-KAB-L, extending the notation of Section 2 in the obvious way.
For the asynchronous life cycles case, there are four additional
strategies that may be optimal. Each of these involves using the
flexible automated technology during the mature stage of product A,
switching to the labor-intensive technology for a period of time while
product A demand declines and product B demand is early in its growth
stage, and then switching back to KAB during the high-demand period of
product B's life cycle. We denote the four strategies that have this
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characteristic by L-KAB-L-KAB, KAB-L-KAB-L, L-K AB-L-KAB KAB'AB
depending, respectively, upon whether technology L is used early in
product A's life cycle, late in product B's life cycle, in both these
periods, or in neither.
One effect of the existence of the flexible, capital-intensive
technology, relative to a situation where only dedicated, capital-
intensive technologies exist as an alternative to the labor-intensive job
shop, is that the technology acquisition problem is easier to analyze.
For example, in the two-product, synchronous-life-cycle technology choice
problem, where the available technologies are L, KA, and KB, the analysis
is quite complex. One source of complexity in this regime is that two
different technologies may be used at the same time, one for each
product: whereas for the problem above, at any given point in time, both
products are produced either with the flexible labor-intensive or the
flexible capital-intensive technology. For this three-technology, two-
product problem, there are fourteen different technology acquisition
timing sequences that can be optimal, compared with only six possible
strategies for the case analyzed above. Using the shorthand notation
developed above, these fourteen are: , L, K A, K B, KA-KB, L-KA-KB, KA-KB-
L, L-KA-KB-L L-KA' L-KB, KA-L, KB-L, L-KA-L, and L-KB-L.
We next examine case (2), where only the nonflexible capital-
intensive (KA, KB) and flexible capital-intensive (KAB) technologies are
available. Several observations about this case are of interest. First,
it can never be optimal to switch from KAB to either KA or KB. This
result arises because of our assumptions that the technologies do not
have capacity constraints and that both (flexible and nonflexible)
- -
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capital-intensive technologies yield the same profit streams in each
market. If capacity constraints were imposed, optimal policies could
involve a portfolio of flexible and nonflexible automated technologies,
as is the case in Fine and Freund (1987).
A second observation is that if the firm acquired technology KA to
enter market A, then it will never switch from technology KA to KAB when
it is ready to enter market B. This result arises from the assumption
that technology KA has zero net salvage value plus exit cost, and the
assumption that IK > IKB. Once the K A technology has already been
AB BA
purchased, the least expensive way to enter the market B is with KB.
A third observation relates to the discount factor, 6. When 6 is
large (i.e., close to one), the optimal policy may specify purchase of
KAB for use over both product life cycles, whereas a smaller value of 6
(with all other parameters unchanged) may dictate purchase of KA for
product A and then KB after product B's life cycle has begun. A higher
interest rate (smaller 6) discourages investment in the flexible capacity
because it requires the entire outlay up front. Sequential investment in
the dedicated technologies avoids acquiring any capabilities before they
are needed. If different companies use different hurdle rates for
technology investments, those with the higher rates will find the
flexible capacity less attractive.
Whether the life cycles are synchronous or asynchronous, the above
observations imply that there are only five technology policies that can
be optimal. These are: never enter either market (), use KA in market A
and KB in market B (KA-KB), use KA in market A and do not enter market B
(KA), use KB in market B and do not enter market A (KB), and use KAB for
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both markets (KAB). For a given set of parameter values, one can solve
explicitly for the optimal technology policy, as follows: For T = KA,
KB, KAB, calculate the candidate entry times ST, the exit times tT, and
the discounted cash flows UT(ST)-IT, as was done in the previous section.
(Note that UK (SK ) includes profits for two markets.) If UT(ST)-IT
AB AB
< 0 for T = KA, KB, and KAB, then the optimal policy is to never enter
either market. If only one of these say T', is positive, then it is
optimal to enter at ST, with technology T' and remain in the
T'
corresponding market(s) until t . If UT(ST)-IT is positive for
T = KA and for T = KB, but negative for T = KAB, then the optimal policy
is, for T = KA and KB: enter with technology T at ST and exit at tT,
from the respective markets.
The other possibilities all have UT(ST)-IT > 0 for T = KAB and one or
both of T = KA or T = KB. If both of the latter are positive, then
the firm should use the KAB only policy if UKAB (SKAB )-IKAB UKA (SKA
AB AB AB A A
IKA + UKB (SK ) IK and use the KA-K B strategy otherwise. If UT(ST) -
A B B B
IT > 0 for only one of T = KA or KB, then the firm should use KAB only
policy if it gives higher net profits, and the KA-only or KB-only
strategy otherwise.
One interesting outcome of this model is that a firm will never
acquire the flexible technology after already owning a dedicated
technology. This result, which suggests the adage, "once an
inflexible mass producer, always an inflexible mass producer,"
provides an interesting juxtaposition with the numerous exhortations
by the promoters of flexible manufacturing systems that firms should
abandon their inflexible, mass production technologies in favor of
flexible, automated technologies.
I
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There are (at least) three ways that we could extend our model
to reverse the result that an inflexible mass producer should never
invest in flexible automation. First, we could assume that technology
KA has a positive net salvage value minus exit costs, denoted by S(A).
If S(A) is sufficiently large, that is, if the net cost (after selling
KA) of purchasing KAB to produce products A and B is less than the
cost of adding KB to produce product B, then we could obtain the
result that the firm switches from inflexible mass production to
flexible automation. (The exact conditions for this move to be
optimal depend on the salvage values of the other two technologies
as a function of time and on the optimal entry and exit times.)
Although an assumption of positive net salvage values can achieve
the result that firms switch to flexible automation, we think it does so
for the wrong reasons. We are not aware of any advocates of flexible
automation who promote the technology based on the cash flow benefits of
selling the equipment it replaces. Rather, flexible automation is touted
for operational efficiencies; superior manufacturing performance in cost,
delivery, and flexibility; and a wide range of strategic benefits.
A second extension of our model, one to include operational
efficiences of flexible automation, i.e., economies of scope in
operation, could also be constructed to reverse the result that
inflexible mass producers should not switch over to flexible automation.
Suppose the operating costs of producing product families A and B on the
flexible technology were assumed to be lower than the operating costs of
producing both families on the two inflexible technologies. In that
case, the operating profits from the two-types of technologies would
satisfy
-28-
AB A B
Tr (at bt'KAB) > T (at,KA ) + T (bt,KB). (*)
Then, provided that the difference between these two quantities is
sufficiently large, the optimal technology policy could involve switching
from the inflexible technology to flexible automation.
The question of when (if ever) inequality (*) actually holds in
practice is one that urgently needs further research. Theoretically,
using the single flexible technology rather than two inflexible
technologies could eliminate some duplication line and/or overhead
functions and provide some economies of scope. However, the added
complexity of the system may decrease manufacturing focus and increase
coordination costs. We know of no empirical work that has addressed
these issues.
A third extension of our model, one that admits a larger sequence of
different product families and uncertainty in the technology investment
costs, could also reverse the result that an inflexible mass producer
never switches to flexible automation. Consider a sequence of product
families, 1, 2,...,n, that have overlapping product life cycles as in
Figure 9. Suppose there is a flexible, capital-intensive technology,
denoted by KF that can produce all of these product families and there
are n dedicated, nonflexible technologies K1, K2,...,Kn, each of which
can manufacture only one product family. For j = 1, 2,...,n, let
I denote the investment/startup cost associated with acquiringK.
dedicated technology Kj. Let IK (t) denote the (stochastic) cost of
acquiring the flexible capacity. We assume that the flexible capacity
is subject to stochastic technological innovation that can decrease the
effective cost of acquiring it. Then, if IK (O ) is high, the firm may
KF
M M__ __
-29-
acquire K1 and perhaps K2 and K, for the early products. If, for some
t, I (t) has declined sufficiently, then it will be optimal for the
firm to switch to the flexible technology, and use it thereafter. Thus,
a richer model with multiple products and a nonstationary investment cost
can yield a result such that a mass producer converts to a flexible
technology.
4. THE LIFE CYCLE OF A FLEXIBLE MANUFACTURING SYSTEM
Of particular interest to us is the asynchronous life cycles case
when the optimal strategy is to only purchase the flexible capacity and
use it for all of the product families. In the two product case (Figure
8b), this strategy requires acquiring the flexible KAB technology at
SK for the mature and late stages of product-family A's life cycle and
AB K
continuing its use until tAB, through most of product-family B's life-
cycle. A property of the optimal policy is that during the time period
[S t ) the product-flexible technology is used only to
AB
manufacture product-family A; during the period (tB, tA**) the flexible
capacity is used to manufacture both product families; and during the
period (tA**,tKAB) the flexible capacity only works on product-family B.
This characteristic of the optimal policy lends an interesting
perspective to Jaikumar's (1986) observation that, for the data he
collected, a typical flexible manufacturing system (FMS) in the U.S.
manfuactures significantly fewer machined parts than a typical FMS in
Japan. Jaikumar suggests that this observation lends credence to a
conclusion that FMS managers in the U.S. are less competent than their
Japanese counterparts. Because this conclusion is based on numerous
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other points, we are not in a position, in this paper, to either discuss
it further or to dispute it. However, we do wish to illustrate how our
model may help to illuminate the discussion.
Jaikumar's data, although it was collected over a period of several
years, essentially represents a snapshot in time of FMS usage in the U.S.
and Japan. He makes no claims to having attempted to develop a time
series of observations. If the Japanese began investing in FMS
technology in earnest earlier than their U.S. competitors (a premise
consistent with Jaikumar's report that the Japanese outspent the U.S. in
FMS by a factor of two from 1982 to 1987) then they may have progressed
further along the life cycle of the FMS technology as compared with their
U.S. competitors. Therefore, a snapshot in time of FMS development in
the U.S. and Japan could capture the FMS's in two countries in different
stages of their life cycles.
Figure 8b, considered in the light of our characterization of the
KAB-only technology policy, is suggestive of the product pattern produced
over the life cycle of a flexible manufacturing system for the two-
product case. Figure 9 is suggestive of the n-product case. In either
case, early in the FMS's life cycle, while the production team is
learning how to use the technology, few products (perhaps all from one
product family) may be manufactured on the FMS.
This stage in the FMS life cycle corresponds to the period (SK ,tB) in
AB
Figure 8b. Once the FMS technology is mature (that is, once the
production team has signficant experience in its use), a larger number of
products (perhaps from several product families) may be manufactured on
the FMS. This stage corresponds to the period (tB,tA**) in Figure 8b.
I ·
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Late in the FMS life cycle, no new products will be allocated to the FMS,
and it will finish off the products already allocated to it, as in the
period (tA**, tKAB) in Figure 8b.
The observations, that compared with the Japanese, U.S. firms
manufacture fewer parts on their FMS's and have invested less in the FMS
technology, are consistent with a hypothesis that, at the time of
Jaikumar's data collection, most U.S. FMS's were in an early stage of the
FMS life cycle. In this light, observed product allocations on U.S.
flexible manufacturing systems may not be suboptimal given their progress
to date on the FMS life cycle. In this case, one could interpret
Jaikumar's recommendations to management as instruction on how to speed
the progress into the maturity phase for the use of this technology. The
data on Japan's experience with the FMS technology could then be
interpreted as reflecting the potential returns to accelerating the life
cycle process. We make this point primarily to illustrate how our model
can provide additional perspective to Jaikumar's data; we do not claim to
have proven that our interpretation is unassailable.
5. CONCLUDING DISCUSSION
As was pointed out by Hayes and Wheelwright, product and process
life cycle considerations can be quite important in the evaluation of
technology choices. Our model of Section 2 formalizes the Hayes-
Wheelwright analysis and illustrates how the cost structures of different
technologies also factor into the technology choice problem.
To analyze a single firm's technology choice problem for flexible
technologies, we extended our formalization of the Hayes-Wheelwright
analysis to include multiple products. Our analysis focuses on the
- I I r
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ability of flexible technology to produce a portfolio of products that
are in different stages of their life cycles. We observe that optimal
use of flexible technology can dictate that a narrow range of products be
produced during the early and late stages of the life cycle of the
technology and during the peak demand stages of the life cycles of some
at the products. This observation provides an alternative inter-
pretation of the data collected by Jaikumar (1986). More data, collected
with the intent of performing a time series analysis, would be useful to
help resolve these questions.
An important topic that the above models do not treat is how
competition affects the technology policies we describe. One way to
analyze this issue is with a game-theoretic model of technology and
market competition. In our models, we assume that firm profits in each
period are a function of only the level of industry demand in that period
and the technology in use. A more realistic model would presume that
industry growth would attract competition which would dampen (or even
reverse) the effect that higher industry demand generates higher firm
profits. Adding this effect could change our results in several ways.
First, pre-emption incentives could cause entry into the industry to
occur earlier in a multifirm game than in the single-firm model. By pre-
empting its rivals with early entry, a firm might discourage later entry
by others and close out some potential competition. In addition, firms
would tend to enter earlier to avoid being pre-empted themselves.
Second, competitive pressures might alter a firm's technology choices.
Since low variable costs might allow a firm to be a "tougher" competitor,
holding the capital-intensive technology might become attractive in a
competitive environment. Buying the capital-intensive technology
_1___1_
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represents a commitment to stay in the industry and fight it out when
competition becomes intense.
All of these ideas have been explored to some degree in the
economics literature. (See Fudenberg and Tirole, 1986, for a survey.)
In our view, a fruitful area for further research is to link the game-
theoretic models in the economics literature to the problem of technology
choice over the product life cycle and to the problem of choosing
flexible versus dedicated technology.
We have begun to work towards this objective in several papers.
In Fine and Li (1986), we analyze one-firm and two-firm models of optimal
exit behavior with stochastic product life cycles but only one type of
technology. (See also Huang and Li (1986) for a continuous-time version
of the same problem.)
Fine and Pappu (1987) use the methodology of repeated games to
analyze competition in a dynamic setting with both flexible and
nonflexible technology. That work explores a two-firm, dynamic,
stationary (no life cycles) version of the model presented in Section
three. In contrast to the work here and in Fine and Freund (1987), where
the absence of competition allows the existence of a flexible technology
to make a firm unequivocally better off, Fine and Pappu show how the
existence of a flexible technology in a competitive environment can
actually make firms worse off by intensifying the competition between
the firms. They also show that it can be optimal to acquire flexible
technology but use it inflexibly; the flexible capability serves only
as a threat to competitors to deter them from invading an incumbent's
market. Further work will be required to add the product life cycle
phenomenon to that model
I - I- I I
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Figure 1: Product-Process Life Cycle Matrix
Source: Haves, R.H. and S.C. Whalwright, "Link Manufacturing Process and Product Life Cycles," Harvard Business
Review, January - February 1979.
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Figure 8a: Demand paths for products with synchronous life cycles.
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Figure 8b: Demand paths for products with asynchronous life cycles.
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